This article analyses and compares ten institutions that have a mandate to promote productivity-enhancing reforms. The selected bodies include government advisory councils, standing inquiry bodies, and ad hoc task forces. We find that well-designed pro-productivity institutions can generally improve the quality of the policy process and political debate, and can make a significant contribution to evidence-based policy-making. Our findings also support the view that concentrating knowledge and research on productivity in one independent, highly skilled and reputed body can help create the momentum and the knowledge that are required to promote long-term productivity growth. Institutions located outside government have more leeway in promoting reforms that challenge vested interests and produce results that go beyond the electoral cycle. Smart government bodies can allow experimental policy-making and a more adaptive, evidence-based policy process. To be successful, pro-productivity institutions require sufficient resources, skills, transparency and procedural accountability to fulfil their tasks; a sufficiently broad mission, oriented towards long-term well-being and with both supply-side and demand-side considerations; policy evaluation functions; and the ability to reach out to the general public in a variety of ways.
physical capital, sluggish recovery in non-residential investment, and demand-side deficiencies. At the same time, OECD analysis shows a growing dispersion of productivity performance within countries between firms and regions, which suggests that there is no real innovation deficit, but rather a diffusion deficit in many countries (OECD, 2016a; Ashford and Renda, 2016) , and insufficient exit, as in the case of "zombie firms" (Andrews et al., 2016) . Data presented in a joint event organized by France Stratégie (Sode, 2016) , and the US Council of Economic Advisers showed a downward trend in productivity in all advanced economies over the second half of the 20th century (Chart 1).
The debate about the slowdown in productivity growth is of sufficient concern to policymakers that the OECD in 2015 created the Global Forum on Productivity. In many countries, the reflection on "secular stagnation" (Hansen, 1939; Summers, 2014; Gordon, 2015) has led to the growing recognition that important, structural changes in domestic and international economic policy are needed to reverse the trend or at least contain the current decline (Ashford and Renda, 2016) . As noted by Banks (2015) , very often the productivity challenge can be successfully tackled only by securing more intense market competition, entry of dynamic new market players and the exit of poor performers. Which very often clashes with the interests of incumbent players, who can exert a very powerful influence on policy choices (OECD, 2015a) .
At the same time, certain current trends (e.g. the internet of things, artificial intelligence, smart manufacturing) are posing new challenges for the measurement of labour and total factor productivity. Indeed, many commentators are still trying to agree on whether the current slowdown is at least partly generated by measurement problems (Byrne et al., 2016; Syverson, 2016 ).
There has been growing recognition that promoting pro-productivity policies can be a particularly daunting task. Such a task is further complicated by the fact that when it comes to productivity, there is neither a silver-bullet solution, nor a standard set of reforms that can be implemented in the same way in every country.
On the contrary, the path towards enhanced productivity varies according to the peculiarity of the national economy and its institutional settings. Other important factors that further challenge policy-makers include the partly demanddriven nature of the productivity slowdown, which makes traditional supply-side recipes less likely to be effective by themselves (Anzoategui et al., 2016) ; and the need to guarantee an institutional setting that is conducive to the promotion and implementation of pro-productivity reforms. In this respect, a plethora of institutions can be put to work with a view to triggering a more intense and meaningful debate on which productivity policies are most suited for a given country. When well-designed, transparently governed and adequately staffed, such institutions can serve a key function in 'neutralising' the undue influence of vested interests in key reform areas (Banks, 2015) .
This debate is the focus of this article. As elaborated by Gary Banks (2015) , there are a multitude of institutions directly or indirectly affecting policies impacting on productivity.
Some of these institutions can be directly established by governments through legislation (e.g. pean Commission. We focus on current institutions at the national level, rather than intragovernmental or supra-national bodies such as the OECD itself, or earlier institutions such as the European Productivity Agency (EPA, 1952-60) , which once had affiliates at the national level. 2 As the reader will realize, these institutions differ in many respects, including their overall size (e.g. staff), date of creation, institutional location, mandate and mission, tasks and deliverables, and budget. In this respect, it is not our goal to draw comparative judgments. Some of the institutions we selected do not explicitly mention productivity in their statutes or mission 
The Ten Surveyed Institutions
Based on their names, our ten selected institutions include six productivity commissions, three advisory councils located at the centre of government and one competitiveness council. 4 However, the boundaries between these institutions are more blurred than it might seem, and the similarities within categories are also not always obvious or precise, as explained below.
The six Productivity Commissions are composed of two major sub-groups that can be identified.
• Four institutions (Australia, Chile, Mexico, New Zealand) feature a design that can be said to have been significantly inspired by the Australian experience, already extensively described in Banks (2015) . However, the Australian • Two productivity commissions (Denmark and Norway) were set up as temporary ad hoc task forces, with limited in-house research capacity and strong (but not necessarily complete) multistakeholder representation. 7 Both institutions took the form of high-level multi-stakeholder fora that met regularly for a limited period of time (two 3 Infomation on the National Productivity Boards is provided in a summary prepared by the European Parliam e n t a t : w w w. e u r o p a r l . e u r o p a . e u / R e g D a t a / e t u d e s / ATA G / 2 0 1 6 / 5 7 4 4 2 3 / IPOL_ATA%282016%29574423_EN.pdf 4 See the OECD's work on centre of government institutions.
5 The Australian Productivity Commission has 163 staff members selected from the best available researchers on the marketplace, and an overall budget that allows for dealing with five large inquiries at the same time (although it currently does more than that).
6 The Chilean national productivity commission relies on a high-level multi-stakeholder board composed of eight members, supported by a secretariat of no more than seven researchers, and a budget that should suffice for two in depth inquiries per year (but is reportedly barely sufficient for one); the Mexican Productivity Commission is a permanent multi-stakeholder advisory platform supported by three full-time members of the economic productivity unit at the Ministry of Finance, although these members have the possibility of leveraging competence existing in their ministry and other institutions.
years), without producing fresh research
or new data, and ended up producing a report with a set of recommendations on ho w t o r e -l a u n c h a n d r ef o r m t he national economy in light of existing challenges (oil price fluctuations for Norway, productivity slowdown for Denmark). 
A Fast-Changing Landscape
It is useful to locate these institutions within the broader set of pro-productivity institutions identified by Banks (2015) , who identifies eleven types of pro-productivity institutions: privately funded think tanks, publicly funded think tanks, trade tribunals, competition authorities, audit bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, departmental bureaus, central bank research units, advisory councils, ad hoc task forces, and standing inquiry bodies.
Within that broad range of institutions, our choice fell on a narrow subset of examples (see One significant finding of our research is the growing importance and perceived usefulness of pro-productivity institutions, and more specifically productivity commissions and advisory councils. 9 The challenges faced by many governments and the horizontal, systemic nature of many of the reforms needed to boost productivity are leading countries to create independent 8 The Danish Productivity Commission focused systematically on issues of productivity, stressing that higher productivity growth is a basic driver of the long run growth in real incomes. The Norwegian Productivity Commission was more eclectic, acknowledging that some policy measures such as measures to bring low-skilled workers into may reduce labour productivity but may nevertheless improve economic efficiency and welfare.
9 Parallel work at the OECD is currently examining aspects of other types of regulatory institutions (OECD, 2016b; OECD, 2017 The latter, as will be explained below, poses different challenges depending on whether the body in question is a standing inquiry body, fully independent of government, or a functionally autonomous body located within the centre of g o v e r n m e n t .
Another important finding of our research that is worth highlighted at this stage is that proproductivity institutions appear to be increasingly inter-dependent and complementary to their country's legal system. For example, especially where regulatory reform has made inroads, the surveyed bodies are extensively co- 
A Closer Look at the Selected Bodies
In this section we provide a more detailed analysis of a number of features of the ten selected bodies. 13
Relationship with government
In terms of the relationship with government, there are two key decisions involved in the establishment of a pro-productivity body:
• Whether the body should be single or multistakeholder: whether to involve various representatives of civil society in a key decisionmaking function (e.g. on the board).
In our sample, the Danish, Norwegian and Chilean Productivity Commissions, the Mexican Productivity Commission and the Irish National Competitiveness Council are multistakeholder; 14 whereas the others are not.
Multi-stakeholder institutions are sometimes public-private, sometimes organized to represent all relevant stakeholders. Typically singlestakeholder bodies tend to be more researchoriented.
• Whether the body should be located inside government, or independent of government. In our 10 See for instance, www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/osirase/ 2015_Global_Go_To_Think_Tank_Index_Top_USandNonUS__.pdf.
11 For additional information on the joint activities of the Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions. see: www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/australia-new-zealand.
12 An example of this productivity data is available at www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/solving-productivity-conundrum 13 More details on each body and each aspect covered in the currenct section are available in Renda and Dougherty (2016) , which also illustrates their diversity.
14 In Chile, the members of the board are named based on their "technical" and "cross-cutting" competences. The Danish Productivity Commission was an independent expert committee, but made considerable efforts to maintain a fruitful dialogue with relevant stakeholders, although some of its recommendations generated some predictable resistance from interest groups that benefit from current anticompetitive regulations. The Norwegian body is considered as multi-stakeholder even though one important stakeholder, unions, were eventually not directly involved. Based on these two basic questions, Table 2 below shows where the bodies surveyed in this article are positioned.
Overall Mandate and Mission
Another key issue in the observation of existing pro-productivity institutions is related to their mandate and mission. The ten selected bodies have one aspect in common: they consider their mandate to be chiefly related to "long-term thinking", of the kind that governments are increasingly unable to engage in, due to resource constraints, as well as pressing shortterm policy challenges. 16 By their very nature, pro-productivity institutions have to devote a significant amount of their time and resources to identifying structural reforms that would improve standards of living in the country, although the extent to which such activity takes 15 The case of Chile is hybrid as the members of the secretariat of the Productivity Commission are under the same contract as civil servants.
16 However, while all institutions consider themselves as focused on long-term issues, opinions diverge as regards the relevance of short-term work. For example, the first months of the Chilean Productivity Commission were characterized by attention to shorter-term issues, as the institution itself was also striving to establish its legitimacy and reputation in the face of government and the public opinion. And all institutions that are called upon to contribute to the evaluation of existing policies, whether ex ante or ex post, can be said to work also on short-term issues alongside longer-term subjects. 
place varies significantly across selected bodies.
In addition, the scope of institutions' mandates varied considerably, with some being set up with a more narrow topical focus, while others are much broader in scope and potential policy reach. Table 3 shows how the pro-productivity bodies surveyed in this article are placed based on the two aspects mentioned in this section
Legitimacy and Process
A very important dimension in the analysis of pro-productivity institutions is their degree of legitimacy to various stakeholders. This concept is usefully broken down into three complementary concepts: input, output and throughput legitimacy, which refer broadly to participation, performance and process, respectively (Schmidt, 2013) . Input legitimacy refers to the degree of participation of stakeholders in the activities of the institution; output legitimacy is determined by the quality of the outputs produced by the institution, as well as by the extent to which they meet the consensus of stakeholders; throughput legitimacy looks at the use of stakeholder consultation and the efficacy, accountability and transparency of governance processes. All three forms of legitimacy are relevant for the purposes of this article, and are discussed below with ref-
erence to the ten selected cases.
Regarding input legitimacy, different countries have adopted different arrangements:
• Some of the selected institutions are multi-stakeholder "by design", since they feature decision-making bodies that include relevant stakeholders from the business sector and/ or organized labour groups (Mexico, Norway, Ireland, to a lesser extent Denmark and Chile).
• Other institutions involve stakeholders extensively during performance of their activities (Australia, New Zealand).
• Other institutions occasionally involve stakeholders in the early phases of their work (the U n i t e d S t a t e s, t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n , France • On the one hand, when the pro-productivity institution is independent of government the terms of reference have to be clearly stated, so that responsibilities can be easily allocated between the institution and the receiving end. In some countries (e.g. Ireland, Denmark, Norway) terms of reference (TORs) have been drafted for the institution as a whole, and were made available to the public. In Australia, Chile and New Zealand
TORs are specified for each inquiry. Especially in Australia and New Zealand, the 17 The Danish Productivity Commission came up with more than 100 policy recommendations many of which have found their way (sometimes in modified form) into subsequent legislation both during the previous and the current government. Overall, the commission's policy recommendations have had a significant impact and there is considerable awareness of the Danish productivity problem in policy circles.
TOR-based process is extremely transparent and inclusive, which certainly contributes to high levels of throughput legitimacy.
• Boards.
• In New Zealand, a Productivity Hub was created as a partnership of agencies, which aims to improve how policy can contribute 18 In the case of the US Council of Economic Advisers, one possible issue was the very short duration of member positions: however, such short duration reportedly helps attracting top-level scholars, who cannot leave their academic positions for more than two years.
19 Although its budget would reportedly be compatible with running as many as five inquiries at the same time, the Commission currently has nine on the • France Stratégie is in charge of evaluating public policies for the French government.
In order to fulfil this mandate, it performs ad hoc policy evaluation and acts also through dedicated initiatives and bodies.
• The Chilean Productivity Commission achieved a major milestone recently when President Bachelet officially endorsed the first of its 21 recommendations, which entails that all new major legislative proposals be subject to a specific productivity impact assessment.
21 All subcommittees feature a multi-stakeholder composition, with strong participation from the government side. They meet independently of the plenary sessions of the Commission, which meets normally four times per year. See www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/6672/Acta_sesion1_CNP.pdf.
22
The Economic Report of the President for 2016 observes that while macroeconomic issues continue to be an important part of the CEA's portfolio, in recent decades the CEA has devoted an increasing amount of attention to microeconomic issues that arise in the context of legislation, regulatory processes, and other administrative actions.
• pro-productivity reforms is often difficult due to the distributional impacts that these reforms often create, requiring at times that powerful incumbents be subject to enhanced competition, or that entirely new business models enter the marketplace. Productivity has been termed by one of our interviewees as facing both an "awareness problem" and an "image problem".
On the one hand, it is hard to communicate why productivity should be a key concern for economic policy in the long run; on the other hand, it is common to hear opinions that associate productivity-oriented reforms with of job losses and reduced safeguards for employees or other social groups. As an example, it reportedly turned out impossible to involve workers' unions in the activities of the Norwegian Productivity Commission.
Many of the interviewed institutions still face important challenges in building a convincing narrative for productivity, and keeping the issue under the spotlight in public debate. Of course, the government and politicians will continue to play a key role in communicating such narratives to the public.
Overall, it is possible to distinguish between institutions that have diversified their activities to adopt a very broad notion of productivity, most often overlapping with long-term wellbeing; and institutions that strive to keep productivity at the core of the activity of government. Emerging lessons include the following.
• Focusing on long-term well-being, rather than productivity stricto sensu, is important to elicit trust and signal the relevance of the institution's work. Institutions in Australia, New Zealand, France, and the European Commission all follow this strategy, both due to their broader official mandate and also to enhance their legitimacy.
• 
Emerging Lessons
This section discusses some of the emerging lessons from the interviews that were conducted for the purposes of this research. A number of these echo the more general findings of Banks (2015). Other countries have decided to set up proproductivity institutions as a response to a specific shock or an emerging policy problem, as was the case for the oil crisis in Norway, evidence of a slowdown in productivity growth in Denmark, or the need to preserve cost competitiveness in Ireland. These emergency-led strategies have led to a narrower scope for the initiatives, be that in terms of duration of the mandate (Norway, Denmark) or in terms of the institution's activities (Ireland).
As a result, there is a strong need to adapt institutional and governance arrangements for pro-productivity institutions to national legal and political culture, as also flagged by the persons interviewed. This can be an iterative process, as once institutions gain more legitimacy, they may be able to pursue a more ambitious approach. To be sure, a key decision to be made is whether the pro-productivity institution to be created should be temporary or permanent in nature. Our findings suggest that there are a d v a n t a g e s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s o f b o t h approaches. A temporary institution should however be given a narrower mandate, and possibly a narrower focus, otherwise it may end up developing too superficial policy recommendations, without reaching a sufficient level of detail.
24 Defining success is not easy for many of the institutions analysed in this article, especially since a few of them have been established very recently, and it would be premature to draw conclusions on their effectiveness in achieving their statutory mission. However, some of them have been in place for longer, and were already subject to a number of external evaluations. This is the case of the Australian Productivity Commission, as reported by Banks (2015: 19) , who finds that past quantitative estimates of the gains from reforms, in particular in industry assistance and economic policy areas, "suggest big returns on the 'investment' by government in the Commission and its staff". In the case of the Council of Economic Advisers, the literature pointed at ups and downs in the influence exerted by the Council on economic policy-making in the White House (McCaleb, 1986) . Recently a White House report pronounced the CEA, on the occasion of its 70 th anniversary, "a durable and effective advocate for the public interest" (White House, 2016). From a slightly different angle, it is interesting to observe that the "TOR system" is more appropriate for truly independent bodies, than for "internal" advisory bodies. But even for independent bodies, TORs should not be the only way for a pro-productivity institution to produce research and policy recommendations.
Within the TOR system, it is essential to ensure that stakeholders have a say on the main pre- The availability of resources is even more important when coupled with a mandate that, in addition to specific "on demand" research, 30 For example, the Norwegian Commission was well supported by competent staff from the relevant economic ministries and also drew on analytical work by Norwegian academic experts and consultants. The Danish commission had a relatively small secretariat (considering its very broad mandate) and could have benefited from having more resources, although its members tried to draw as much as possible on outside expertise and relevant academic research.
allows for the institutions own research initiatives. When this is explicitly foreseen (e.g. Australia, Chile, New Zealand), most often the budget is insufficient to leave space for spontaneous initiatives, and this is potentially weakening the pro-productivity potential of these institutions' work. budgets (Thompson, 2010) . Having an institution think about issues that require reform in the country's public policies is increasingly essential.
However, it would be naïve to imagine that an institution can at the same time be plugged into the policy process, provide influential policy recommendations to government, and stay away entirely from short-term issues. In addition, relatively new institutions often find short-term issues to be a useful opportunity to enhance their reputation and legitimacy for the wider public. In addition, reports that focus on shortterm as well as long-term initiatives have proven to be very useful. Bodies can also play a useful role by "framing" short-term issues from a longterm perspective, capturing economy-wide ramifications and incorporating future social, economic and technological transitions in their analysis.
Accordingly, there seems to be reason to believe that a combination of short-and longterm research and advocacy is to be preferred to a less balanced approach, as it can increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of pro-productivity institutions, and in addition makes them more easily plugged into the policy-making process. Depending on the institutional location of the pro-productivity institution, the arrangements that might promote a further involvement in the policy process can vary. The ones that seem more effective and important include the following:
• Coupling policy recommendations with a preliminary impact analysis, which incorporates an assessment of the distributional impacts of proposed reforms. This could help government bodies in charge of ex ante regulatory impact analysis in conducting their evaluation; it would also help the data produced "speak for themselves", including for media outreach and policy advocacy purposes; and it would also incentivize pro-productivity institutions to form u l a te " a c t i o na b l e" , ev id enc e -b a se d recommendations.
• Carrying out early stakeholder consultation on proposed reforms. This can lead to the collection of data and stakeholder positions in a way that facilitates government in the subsequent phases of the policy cycle.
• Assisting regulatory oversight bodies in validating the quality of economic analysis of proposed new regulation. Especially when pro-productivity institutions can rely on highly skilled economists, this role could prove very important for government.
• Assisting government departments and ministries in the retrospective review of existing rules, or clusters of rules. Proproductivity institutions are well positioned to help governments run an in-depth evaluation of entire policy areas, individual pieces of legislation/regulation, or the performance of specific industry sectors.
• Evaluating the functioning of the whole regulatory system. Independent bodies that possess a consolidated reputation are well positioned to perform such an evaluation.
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
This article contains the results of a comparative analysis of ten pro-productivity institutions, and draws a number of lessons that could prove useful for the institutions themselves, and for governments and legislatures that are currently considering whether to create new pro-productivity institutions. The ten selected institutions can be classified as advisory councils, standing inquiry bodies or ad hoc task forces, and do not exhaust the possible choices available to a given country when it comes to stimulating and promoting the debate on pro-productivity reforms.
Moreover, the peculiarity of legal systems and the importance of context in determining the optimal design, mandate, mission and governance of pro-productivity institutions limit the possible extension of individual findings to all other institutional settings.
That said, this article broadly confirms earlier work for the OECD (Banks, 2015) However, it takes smart and effective governments to engage with independent pro-productivity institutions, to fully understand their recommendations and translate them into concrete reform initiatives.
Our analysis adds to existing knowledge in several respects. We find that, despite existing constraints, well-designed productivity commissions can generally improve the overall quality of the political debate over economic, social and environmental reforms, and contribute to evidence-based policy-making. Our results also support the view that centralizing knowledge and research on productivity in one independent and highly skilled body can help create the momentum and the knowledge required to promote long-term productivity growth. And importantly, we find evidence that while institutions located outside government have more leeway in promoting reforms that challenge vested interests and produce results over a time span that goes beyond the electoral cycle, the existence of smart government bodies can engage to a much larger extent in experimental policy-making and pave the way for a more adaptive policy process, based on evidence.
In all this, it is of utmost importance that these bodies be given sufficient resources, skills, transparency and procedural accountability to fulfil their tasks; a sufficiently broad mission, which looks at long-term well-being and at both supply-side and demand-side; policy evaluation functions, be they related to the bodies' own proposed reforms, or to existing or proposed government policies; and the ability to reach out to the general public in a variety of ways, from consultation to advocacy, use of social media, and other forms of communication.
